Nuclear power's uneasy history

The file shows the passage of time, thin and well-fingered. Document 36 in EG1, dating back to 1953, is typical of the thousands of pieces of Whitehall 'literature' housed at the National Archives, fascinating in content, under-stated in terms of political and economic implications.

Document 36 is no different. The one-time secret Energy Department file details the events surrounding the arrival of the nuclear power age, its early teething problems and the political tug of war with the US.

The pen of Lord Cherwell, scientific adviser to both Churchill and Attlee, runs heavily through changes in the draft of a white paper providing reassurances that nuclear power was safe and competitive. More than a decade of work in Britain and in Canada during wartime had proved the technology.

There was an uneasy backdrop. The file provides insight into US reluctance to share post-war atomic secrets and technology with a Labour administration and the difficulties Attlee faced in persuading a reluctant Eisenhower to increase Britain's atomic arsenal.

Almost casually a two page summary of a late 1953 conversation between the two leaders mentions that Britain had a stockpile of 100 atomic bombs while the US with 2,500 in reserve was producing them at the rate of 600 a year. Attlee jumped when told Eisenhower wanted to drop an atomic bomb on Manchuria to bring down the curtain on the Korean conflict.